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Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism 
and Consciousness. 
 
Will Davies and Neil Levy 
 
There is a strong intuition that conscious beings have a special kind and perhaps an 
especially high degree of moral significance denied to beings that lack consciousness. 
Though we think that the way in which this special significance is spelt out is often 
misleading, we think that the intuition is well grounded: some kind of consciousness 
does make a significant difference to a being’s moral status.  
 
It is this intuition that explains the excitement surrounding recent work by clinicians 
and neuroscientists that apparently demonstrates consciousness in patients previously 
diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state (PVS).1 We think that the inference from 
the experimental data to the presence of consciousness is too hasty.2 Building on 
recent work by Colin Klein, we will suggest that a key assumption underlying this 
inference is far less solid than it has appeared. Our argument casts doubt on 
methodologies that take command following as a marker for endogenous intentional 
agency, and hence for consciousness. Klein himself nonetheless accepts that these 
patients are conscious, although for reasons other than their apparent ability to follow 
basic commands. We are not convinced by Klein’s reasons for attributing 
consciousness, and hence adopt a more pessimistic position regarding the 
interpretation of the data. In closing, we shall argue that even if Klein is right and 
these patients do enjoy some kind of consciousness, this is not a kind of consciousness 
that could ground the special kind of moral status typically assigned to conscious 
human beings. 
 
Methodological Assumptions in the Science of Consciousness 
Our aim in this section is to briefly review the key findings that have motivated much 
of the discussion about borderline states of consciousness, and then highlight some 
key assumptions at work in the relevant scientific studies. We shall not rehearse the 
empirical evidence in any detail, given that other chapters in this volume provide 
extensive discussion. Briefly, there are two key pieces of evidence which have 
impressed commentators. Owen et al. (2006) showed that the neural activation in a 
PVS patient who was asked to imagine playing tennis and navigating around their 
own house was very similar to the neural activation exhibited by healthy controls 
asked to perform the same tasks. Building on these results, Monti et al. (2010) used 
the same paradigm to develop what was, in effect, an fMRI-based communication 
1 It is unclear to us how the putative cases of consciousness should alter our classification of these patients. It might seem that such consciousness would shift these patients from a classification of PVS to the minimally conscious state (MCS). Another possibility, however, is that the degree of consciousness would be sufficient to place these patients in the category of locked-in syndrome. We remain neutral on these classificatory issues.  2 One of us has previously questioned whether the data shows that the patients have the kind of consciousness routinely assumed to be at issue, namely phenomenal consciousness. Since phenomenal consciousness is not the kind of consciousness that actually does the bulk of the work in underwriting moral status of the kind and degree at issue, however, that quibble now seems irrelevant. 1  
                                                        
system, in which an apparently vegetative patient was able to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
questions by imagining playing tennis or imagining navigating a familiar 
environment. 
 
The precise details of the neural activation exhibited by PVS patients do not much 
matter for our purposes. What most interests us are the grounds for the inference from 
these experimental data to the conclusion that the patients are conscious. The key 
assumption underlying this inference, with which the experimenters and subsequent 
commentators largely seem to agree, is that the data provide evidence for the presence 
of agency, which in turn indicates the presence of consciousness (Bayne 2013). More 
precisely, the patient’s capacity to follow task instructions, such as to imagine playing 
tennis, is assumed to signal an endogenously generated intention to comply with the 
instructions, which in turn signals the presence of intentional agency, and hence 
consciousness. We can break down this inference into two components: 
 
Command Following: Command following is a marker of intentional agency; 
i.e. evidence for command following provides strong evidence for the 
presence of intentional agency. 
 
Agency: Intentional agency is a marker of consciousness; i.e. evidence for 
intentional agency provides strong evidence for the presence of consciousness. 
 
In combination, Command Following and Agency seem to guide much of the research 
into borderline states of consciousness.3 It has been said that first-personal subjective 
report is the gold standard for the ascription of consciousness. In the absence of such 
reports, Agency surely provides the silver standard for consciousness. Since 
command following is taken to imply intentional agency, it in turn provides what we 
might think of as the bronze standard for consciousness: 
 
Bronze Standard: Command following is a marker of consciousness; i.e. 
evidence for command following provides strong evidence for the presence of 
consciousness.4 
 
Given that the patients at issue in these studies are incapable of verbal report, they do 
not satisfy the gold standard. Given that they do not exhibit signs of endogenous 
agency (despite apparent preservation of the neural and motoric machinery required 
for endogenous agency), they do not satisfy the silver standard. That leaves the bronze 
standard as the only option for researchers. Reliance on the standard is clearly visible 
in the work of Owen et al. (2006) and Monti et al. (2010). 
 
In what follows, our aim is to cast doubt on the use of the bronze standard in such 
studies. While we do not dispute that this standard provides a useful means of 
studying consciousness in normal subjects, we have serious concerns about its 
application in severely brain injured patients. Why accept the inference from 
3 Indeed one of the core diagnostic criteria for transitioning into MCS from PVS is ‘following simple commands’ on a ‘reproducible or sustained basis’ (Giacino et al. [2002] p. 351). 4 Since command following is normally taken to imply intentional agency, whereas agency 
signifies consciousness, the link between command following and agency is strictly stronger than the link between agency and the attribution of consciousness.  2  
                                                        
command following, a capacity to follow task instructions, to the presence of 
intentional agency, and thence to consciousness?  
 
Command Following and Akinetic Mutism 
Command Following looks rather shaky in the light of the following. As recently 
discussed by Klein, the responsive PVS patient group bears many similarities to 
patients suffering from akinetic mutism (AM). AM is a wakeful state in which 
patients exhibit a severe and persistent decrease in responsiveness; a lack of 
spontaneous motor or verbal activity; indifference to pain, thirst, or hunger; flattened 
affect; and apathy without depression. As Klein interprets the data from AM patients, 
they are not capable of endogenous intention formation, and hence they lack a 
capacity for endogenous agency.5 Despite their lack of spontaneous activity, AM 
patients are capable of instruction following and answering questions. Given the right 
prompts, AM patients may even engage in complex activity, such as reading a test 
and answering questions about it. Following Klein, we classify such responses as 
stimulus-evoked cognition, as contrasted with endogenously initiated intention and 
action. AM patients are claimed to be acting on commands without the mediation of 
endogenous intention, and hence without endogenous agency. As such, Command 
Following simply doesn’t stand up in AM. 
 
The PVS patients in the cited studies and AM patients have damage to much the same 
parts of the brain.6 In particular, both patient groups exhibit damage to pre-
supplementary motor area (SMA), which is heavily implicated in the literature on 
AM, and which many studies suggest is associated with voluntary, endogenous, 
actions. Both patient groups exhibit a complete absence of self-initiated action or 
response, which is not explained by paralysis. Moreover, the studies of Owen et al. 
(2006) and Monti et al. (2010) suggest that these PVS patients likewise retain a latent 
capacity to follow task instructions and even answer questions. Given the structural 
and behavioural similarities, then, it is plausible to suggest that responsive PVS 
patients are complying with the experimenters’ requests in an analogous (or even 
identical) manner to the way in which AM patients engage in this behavior.7 On this 
model, responsive PVS patients are exhibiting stimulus-evoked cognition in response 
to task commands, but not an endogenously generated intention to imagine playing 
tennis or navigating about one’s house. And if this is right, then Command Following 
doesn’t hold up in the study of borderline states of consciousness either. 
 
One immediate response would be that although the command following exhibited by 
these patients is stimulus evoked and hence not endogenously initiated, it still signals 
a residual, functioning, capacity for agency in these subjects. Even though these 
events are exogenously stimulated, the thought goes, they nonetheless establish the 
presence of an intentional response, and that is all that is required to establish agency, 
and hence consciousness. While this move is tempting, we think it ought to be 
5 Klein adopts a scientific notion of ‘intention’, which ‘simply stands for whatever internal motivational state gives rise to a particular action, subject only to the restriction that it is a sufficiently complex state that it cannot occur completely automatically.’ 6 For more details see Klein §3.3.1. 7 Note that the claim is not that responsive PVS patients are AM, just that there is a shared deficit of endogenous intention, and hence of endogenous agency. The explanatory power of such a model should be judged on its merits, then, not on the plausibility of a diagnosis of AM in the PVS patient group. 3  
                                                        
resisted. Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that the data do establish the presence 
of an intentional response, by which we mean an event that is initiated and guided by 
an intention, an internal motivational state that prompts action (including mental 
action). We think that intentional responses in this sense do not suffice to establish 
agency. Agency is best understood as requiring the ability not simply to act or 
respond, but to act in a way that is relatively independent of stimuli, and that requires 
considerable flexibility of response. What is required is not simply the formation and 
execution of intentions, but of endogenously initiated intentions. The patient groups 
under discussion do not exhibit agency in this sense. The responsive PVS patients do 
not (as far as we know) issue responses of this sort without external prompting, and 
their responses are moreover extremely inflexible and constrained. Even granting the 
presence of intentions to act or imagine, then, command following does not suffice in 
this case for the attribution of agency, and hence does not suffice to establish the 
presence of consciousness. 
 
Others are free to define ‘agency’ as they wish, of course, and one can imagine many 
less demanding notions than that sketched above. In particular, some may wish to tie 
agency to mere intentional response, even when that response is stimulus bound and 
inflexible. However, we think that this attenuated (by our lights) notion of agency 
provides a weak foundation for the attribution of consciousness to responsive PVS 
patients. At most, it seems to us to provide grounds for ascribing consciousness to 
patients only when they are exhibiting a stimulus evoked intentional response. 
Consciousness here would be ‘fleeting and stimulus-bound’, as Klein puts it.8 This is 
because if agency is the operative marker for consciousness, and if ‘agency’ is 
exhibited only when exogenously evoked, and not at all otherwise, then presumably 
the evidential situation warrants the attribution of consciousness only when the 
subject is following the experimenters’ commands. In contrast, agency in our 
preferred sense, which requires an endogenously initiated and flexible response, 
would provide much stronger evidence for a standing or uninterrupted conscious 
state. 
 
Let’s take stock. So far, we’ve argued that Command Following looks very shaky in 
the case of AM. Given the neural and behavioural similarities between AM and 
responsive PVS patients, it is plausible to model responsive PVS patients as sharing a 
deficit in endogenous intention formation. If this model holds, Command Following 
also looks shaky in these studies at the borders of consciousness, and this in turn 
entails that the responses of PVS patients do not provide strong evidence for the 
presence of. The PVS data can be interpreted as involving nothing more than 
stimulus-evoked cognition, hence no endogenous agency, and hence no 
consciousness. 
 
As we’ll see in the next section, Klein nonetheless thinks that extreme AM patients 
and responsive PVS patients are in fact conscious. Given the foregoing arguments, 
clearly this inference has to go via another route besides Command Following and 
Agency. Our next task will be to critically evaluate his reasons for attributing 
consciousness in such cases. 
 
8 Klein considers and rejects this interpretation of ‘fleeting’ consciousness, which has been proposed elsewhere in the literature by Damasio (2000). 4  
                                                        
Another Route to Attributing Consciousness? 
Despite casting doubt on Command Following, Klein nevertheless suggests that AM 
patients are conscious in some sense. It follows that he also sees no reason to deny 
consciousness to responsive PVS patients. In what sense are these patients deemed to 
be conscious? And on what grounds, if not via the Bronze Standard, are we supposed 
to attribute consciousness in such cases? 
 
Regarding the first question as to what type of consciousness is at issue, Klein 
suggests that AM patients possess peripheral consciousness without focal 
consciousness, a distinction derived from Kriegel (2004). As we understand it from 
Kriegel, peripheral consciousness is the sort of awareness that one has, for example, 
of objects in peripheral vision, the sound of passing cars as one listens to a concerto, 
or a background sense of cheerfulness resulting from my good mood. Focal 
consciousness in contrast is the sort of awareness one has of a foveated section of text 
held in front of one’s face, or the melody line played by the soloist of a concerto. 
Klein seems to use ‘peripheral consciousness’ in a somewhat looser sense: he views 
focal consciousness as involving the allocation of attention, whereas peripheral 
consciousness involves some awareness of unattended stimuli.9 We think that nothing 
crucial hangs on this issue in what follows. 
 
As for the second question, regarding the alternative route to attributing 
consciousness, Klein draws on two sources of evidence for the claim that AM patients 
are conscious (in the peripheral sense). The first source is self-reports by symptomatic 
AM patients. Patients with less severe forms of AM report a curiously ‘empty’ mental 
state; these introspective reports are taken by Klein to be extremely good evidence 
that they are conscious. The second source concerns retrospective reports by patients 
who have recovered from AM. In some (but, importantly, not all) cases, they report 
having had some consciousness of their surroundings and of events when they were 
symptomatic. 
 
We are skeptical that either source of evidence provides strong grounds for attributing 
consciousness to AM patients. Let’s first consider self-reports by symptomatic AMs. 
Here we should distinguish between two possible cases. The first is self-reports in 
patients with mild to moderate AM, who we assume are capable of some degree of 
spontaneous, self-initiated, activity. The second is self-reports in patients with 
extreme cases of AM, who let’s assume are completely incapable of any degree of 
spontaneous, self-initiated, activity. 
 
There are two worries concerning the first type of case. First, it is unclear why self-
reports in such moderate cases of AM should be considered relevant to the argument 
concerning consciousness in PVS patients. PVS patients, we assume, are most similar 
to extreme AM patients, if indeed they are similar to AM patients at all. They are 
most akin to extreme AM patients because (like them) PVS patients exhibit no 
spontaneous, self-initiated, activity whatsoever. As such, it is of questionable 
relevance that some moderate AM patients, who are capable of some self-initiated 
activity, self-report states of consciousness. A second, related, worry is that if 
moderate AM patients are capable of some spontaneous activity, it is reasonable to 
infer that they retain some capacity for endogenous intention and agency. But if it is 
9 Klein has endorsed our interpretation in correspondence.  5  
                                                        
antecedently known that moderate AM patients have some capacity for endogenous 
agency, then self-reports of consciousness are not even essential: we can simply 
appeal to Agency, the claim that intentional agency is a strong marker for the 
presence of consciousness. (Recall that our target above was Command Following, 
not Agency: for all we’ve said, Agency is just fine.) For moderate AM patients, then, 
we have an alternative, independent, basis for attributing consciousness – a basis that 
is unavailable in PVS patients, for whom spontaneous activity, hence clear signs of 
endogenous agency, are crucially lacking. This disparity makes it wholly illegitimate 
to appeal to putative examples of consciousness in moderate AM patients, in order to 
support claims of consciousness in responsive PVS patients. 
 
We can also raise concerns regarding the second type of case, that is, self-reports in 
extreme AMs.10 As we’ve characterized them, extreme AM patients are completely 
incapable of any degree of spontaneous, self-initiated, activity. As such, we can 
assume that any self-report issued by an extreme AM would have to be prompted or 
otherwise elicited. This creates a highly unusual situation regarding the evidential 
status of such reports. In order to see this point, let’s briefly rehearse the dialectic to 
this point. Our overarching question is whether extreme AM patients, likewise 
responsive PVS patients, are conscious. Both we and Klein agree that mere 
responsiveness to commands, or stimulus-evoked cognition, is insufficient to establish 
the presence of consciousness. Klein nonetheless believes that AM patients are 
conscious, and is therefore required to provide some independent grounds for 
attributing consciousness in such cases. And now here’s the puzzle: what are we to 
say when the tendered grounds for attributing consciousness are stimulus-evoked self-
reports regarding the patient’s putative state of consciousness? Our inclination is to 
say that if stimulus-evoked cognition in general provides insufficient grounds to 
attribute consciousness, then we should also conclude that stimulus-evoked self-
reports of consciousness provide insufficient grounds to attribute consciousness. We 
admit that there might be some superficial weirdness in this response, but it strikes us 
as the logical conclusion given the foregoing discussion. 
 
We’ve been discussing Klein’s first source of evidence for consciousness in AM self-
report in symptomatic patients. Klein’s second source of evidence is retrospective 
reports by patients who recover from AM. Some of the problems raised above for 
self-report also apply to retrospective reports. In particular, if the retrospective reports 
are from someone who has recovered from mild or moderate AM, then they are of 
dubious relevance to the issue at hand. In order to focus on the most challenging case, 
however, let’s consider a retrospective report from someone seemingly recovered 
from extreme AM.11 Klein discusses Laplane’s (1984) patient, who describes his past 
state as like having ‘a blank in my mind’. When quizzed on private thoughts, 
Bogousslavsky’s et al.’s (1991) patient said ‘I think of nothing’, ‘I don’t want 
anything’. Another said they ‘did not have any projects for the future and did not have 
any personal thoughts’. 
 
While extremely interesting, it is unclear that statements of this sort provide any real 
evidence regarding the putatively conscious states of the individual while they were 
10 We’re not in fact sure whether any such reports exist, but this doesn’t matter. The argument goes through all the same. 11 Again we are not sure whether such retrospective reports from genuine extreme AMs exist. This does not matter for our argument. 6  
                                                        
symptomatic. First, there are general worries about the quality and accuracy of 
testimony in such cases. Given the strikingly bizarre, uncommon, and elusive nature 
of extreme AM, perhaps it is simply not reasonable to expect recovered subjects to 
have well formed, reliable, thoughts about their symptomatic state. Second, all of the 
reports quoted above concern absences or failures, such as the absence of thought or 
desire. It is extremely unclear how to interpret such reported absences. One option 
would be to infer that the patient was, while symptomatic, in some sense conscious of 
having a ‘blank in their mind’, and that this memory is reported in their retrospective 
appraisal. Another option, which seems at least equally plausible, however, is that the 
patient is just trying to find a way to report an absence of consciousness. These 
retrospective attempts might be aided or enhanced by the fact that the subject, while 
symptomatic, ex hypothesi would have been capable of certain types of stimulus-
evoked cognition, and hence would have retained some degree of informational 
sensitivity to sensory input. Recovered patients might even have access to some of the 
information that was taken up by the cognitive system during this period. But 
recalling informational content that might have been conscious in a normal subject is 
not necessarily recalling consciousness. Recovered patients might also acquire some 
sort of awareness that their explicit beliefs, desires, and intentions did not change 
during the symptomatic period, and might report this by saying that they ‘wanted 
nothing’ or did not ‘have any projects’ during this period. Such retrospective 
appraisals, however, clearly do not force the attribution of conscious awareness of 
such absences while they were symptomatic. 
 
Further analysis and careful reflection on these puzzling cases is certainly required. 
As things stand, however, we find no compelling reason to think that extreme AM 
patients – the most relevant group, as far as the comparison with PVS patients is 
concerned – are conscious. At the very least, if there is any consciousness in such 
patients, these states most likely would be fleeting and stimulus-bound. 
 
The Moral Status Question 
In this final section, we consider the moral significance of purported attributions of 
consciousness in PVS patients. Notwithstanding the skeptical conclusions of the 
previous two sections, let’s suppose for the sake of argument that Klein is correct and 
that extreme AM patients are conscious, and that responsive PVS patients are similar 
enough in terms of their deficits to warrant the attribution of consciousness to them 
too. Let’s even suppose that both sets of patients are conscious all (or much) of the 
time, and not just when they are prompted. Would they then enjoy the moral status 
that is rightly attributed to normal subjects in virtue of the fact that they are 
conscious? We suggest that the answer is no. 
 
One of us has previously argued that the bulk of the work in underwriting moral status 
is done not by the capacity for experience per se, but by the capacity to have series of 
appropriately linked mental states (Levy 2009; Levy & Savulescu 2009). A being 
with an interest in having a life must be able to care how its life goes, and this 
requires very sophisticated cognitive abilities, such as an ability to conceive of oneself 
as a being persisting through time, to recall one’s past, to plan and to have preferences 
for how one’s life goes (Singer 1993; McMahan 2002).  
 
It seems clear that phenomenal consciousness is neither (metaphysically) necessary 
nor sufficient to sustain this kind of interest in having a life. Rather, it seems that what 7  
is required is for the being to self-attribute informational states of the right kind. This 
in turn requires the simultaneous availability of these informational states to (some of) 
the consuming systems constitutive of its mind. It follows that a necessary condition 
of possessing a serious interest in life is something akin to Block’s (1995) notion of 
access consciousness, though – because we wish to avoid building in some of the 
commitments of Block’s notion, such as the stipulation that information of which a 
being is access consciousness is poised for the rational guidance of its behavior – we 
shall call this kind of consciousness informational consciousness. 
 
To have a serious interest in life, a being must self-attribute an appropriate set of its 
mental representations, where the content of these representations concern its own 
plans and projects, and the ground of these plans and projects: its own existence. A 
serious interest in life therefore requires self-consciousness, of this self-attributing 
kind, which in turn depends on informational consciousness in the sense outlined 
above. Only a being that is self-conscious of an appropriate set of representations can 
hold itself as having plans and projects and therefore possess future-oriented desires 
with regard to these plans and projects. Only a being like this can suffer the 
distinctive harm associated with death: the permanent thwarting of these plans and 
projects. Only a being who can suffer such a harm has a reason to fear death (rather 
than dying). 
 
Interpreting the moral significance of the foregoing experimental results therefore 
requires answering several questions, empirical and conceptual, in order to establish 
whether patients possess the capacity for informational consciousness (with the right 
contents) and for self-consciousness (again, with the right contents). As we saw, Klein 
attributes peripheral consciousness to the PVS patient group. We have expressed 
doubts about this attribution, but for the purposes of discussion we accept it. In the 
previous section, peripheral consciousness was characterized as the sort of awareness 
one has of items in the periphery of one’s visual field, for example, or of a 
background mood of happiness. Perhaps this type of consciousness accompanies 
objects or states that are unattended by the subject. Given this understanding, one way 
to interpret states of peripheral consciousness is as a subset of states of phenomenal 
consciousness. The thought here is that if one’s entire visual field constitutes one’s 
total state of visual phenomenal consciousness, then presumably points in the 
periphery of this field would constitute a subset of states of visual phenomenal 
consciousness. As pointed out above, however, an exclusively phenomenal notion of 
consciousness such as this cannot do the work of underwriting a serious interest in 
life. On this reading, then, the attribution of peripheral consciousness gets us no closer 
to moral significance than the attribution of purely phenomenal consciousness. 
 
On another interpretation of peripheral consciousness, this notions carries with it 
implications not, or not just, of phenomenal consciousness, but of informational 
consciousness in the sense outlined above. On this understanding, one’s peripheral 
consciousness of a background mood of happiness, say, would have informational 
content that is available to cognitive consuming systems. Even in this case, however, 
the prospects of underwriting a serious interest in life are not much improved. We 
assume that states of peripheral consciousness would have relatively thin, 
impoverished, indeterminate, and perhaps highly determinable informational contents. 
Peripheral consciousness therefore would offer very little to one’s consuming systems 
in the way of specific, categorized, or recognitional information about one’s 8  
environment, one’s moods and desires, and so on. And this seems to fall well short of 
the sorts of content required for the formation, monitoring, and self-attribution of 
plans and projects by the subject. How could I so much as form, let alone self-
attribute, a plan to reach for the glass by my bedside, if my awareness of the glass is 
limited to the sort of vague, indeterminate, uncategorized awareness that one has of 
objects in the periphery of vision? 
 
There are many complications here that warrant more extended discussion. One such 
complication is that insofar as responsive PVS patients can be attributed some kind of 
consciousness, they would admittedly have a degree of moral status that completely 
nonconscious beings lack. More specifically, if these patients possess peripheral 
consciousness, we assume that they could have some peripheral awareness of pain 
and pleasure. We are somewhat unclear on what the nature of such peripheral pains 
and pleasures would be like: for example, would the attention grabbing nature of pain 
put pressure on the idea that one could be merely peripherally conscious of pain? 
Whatever the truth of the matter, the mere peripheral awareness of pain and pleasure 
might create obligations to take these states into account, for example, in issuing 
analgesics or creating environments in which sensory pleasures can be increased. 
 
A second complication concerns the suggestion (made by Klein) that subjects who 
possesses a standing state of peripheral consciousness might come to have states of 
focal consciousness when prompted. That is to say, perhaps issuing a command to an 
unresponsive patient could shift them from an indeterminate and inattentive state of 
awareness to a state with richer content through greater allocation of attention. If this 
were the case, it would be reasonable to think that they could come to have focal 
consciousness given other kinds of stimuli. In particular, they might have full-blown 
focal awareness of pain and pleasure, states that are plausibly of direct moral 
significance. Here the moral obligations to take these states into account in making 
treatment decisions, for example, would be much clearer-cut than in the case of 
merely peripheral pain and pleasure. Even granting these points, however, one of us 
thinks that these experiences in normal subjects get a great deal of their moral 
significance from their wider role in agents’ mental lives, not from their raw 
phenomenal feel (Levy 2009). Unless it could also be established that these patients 
are also deploying the resources of informational and self-consciousness in registering 
and self-ascribing these states, then, it follows that pain is not as bad and pleasure not 
as good for these patients. 
 
Conclusions 
The mental lives of patients in extreme and prolonged states of unresponsiveness 
remains one of the most puzzling and ethically significant issues in contemporary 
brain science and medicine. We believe that the waves of excitement surrounding 
putative findings of consciousness in PVS patients have been premature. The 
methodology encapsulated in the bronze standard, which takes the ability to follow 
commands as a proxy for consciousness, is of dubious standing. Following a plausible 
model of the impairments characterizing AM, command following cannot be adopted 
as a straightforward marker of endogenous intentional agency in such patients. The 
mere capacity for stimulus-evoked cognition and response in our view does not 
suffice for agency, and hence cannot provide the desired link to consciousness. Much 
further work is clearly needed to understand the range and limits of such exogenously 
initiated intention and action. Such future work will shed further light on the mental 9  
states of patients suffering these profound impairments in the capacity for endogenous 
action. Perhaps at some later stage another route to the attribution of consciousness 
will be found in such patients. We would welcome such developments. As we have 
argued, however, even granting such claims of consciousness, their ethical 
significance should not be immediately inflated. One plausible candidate for the 
putative consciousness exhibited in such cases, peripheral consciousness, lacks the 
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